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Abstract
This article seeks to advance the underdeveloped literature on coalitions in direct democracy by considering intra-camp
coalitions (ICC) at the level of political elites. The binary format of ballot measures leads to the formation of two opposing
camps (i.e., supporters and opponents). However, political actors who belong to a given camp are not obliged to work
with each other in the course of direct-democratic campaigns. I argue that the formation of ICC is ideologically driven, as
political actors may be inclined to more closely cooperate with those actors who share their beliefs. Therefore, I expect
that the actors of a given camp will create ideologically more homogeneous coalitions. The empirical analysis focuses on
the salient issue of asylum by examining the cooperative ties between political organizations that participated in two Swiss
referendum campaigns. Drawing on the CONCOR algorithm, I identify the actor compositions of the four camps in ques-
tion. I show that the organizations that form the two main ICC on either side significantly differ from each other in terms
of their positioning on the left-right scale. Hence, actors who campaign on the same side tend to separate into coalitions
that are ideologically more homogeneous.
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1. Introduction
In contrast to electoral studies, the scholarly literature on
direct democracy thus far neglects the analysis of coali-
tions. This article proposes focusing on the actor compo-
sition of both supporters and opponents in intra-camp
coalitions (ICC) at the level of political elites by examining
ballot measures in the context of referendum campaigns.
Direct-democratic votes are usually characterized by two
options, given that issue-specific propositions can either
be accepted or rejected. This binary format leads to the
formation of two opposing camps: supporters who advo-
cate for a reform and opponents who want to maintain
the status quo. However, political actors who belong to
a given camp are not obliged to work with each other
during their engagement in a campaign. This article is in-
terested in what shapes the composition of supporters’
and opponents’ camps in referendum campaigns. I argue
that the formation of ICC is ideologically driven and that
shared beliefs are expected to facilitate cooperation be-
tween actors. In contrast, actors with unshared beliefs
are unlikely to join forces, as cooperation would likely
give rise to disagreements and conflicts. I therefore ex-
pect the actors of a given camp to separate into coalitions
that are ideologically more homogeneous.
This empirical analysis focuses on the salient issue
of asylum by considering ICC in the context of two ref-
erendums that took place in Switzerland at the federal
level in 2006 and 2016. These cases differ in terms of
actor constellation. While the 2006 referendum essen-
tially gave rise to a divide between the left and the right,
the 2016 referendum pitted moderate against extreme
actors. The data used in this study are based on coop-
erative ties that were reported in the framework of ex-
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post interviews with representatives of the political or-
ganizations (state actors, parties, economic associations,
citizen groups, and committees) that actively took part
in the two selected referendum campaigns. The empir-
ical investigation relies on network analysis by making
use of the CONCOR algorithm in order to identify the
compositions of the two main coalitions for each of the
four camps under scrutiny (i.e., the supporters and oppo-
nents of the two selected ballot measures). In line with
my expectation, I show that coalition formation is ideo-
logically driven. More specifically, I demonstrate that the
organizations of the two main ICC on either side consis-
tently differ from each other in a statistically significant
way in regard to their positioning on the left-right scale.
Hence, actors of a given camp tend to split into ideologi-
cally more homogeneous coalitions.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows.
Section 2 develops the theoretical argument. Section 3
focuses on the research design, including a discussion of
the case selection as well as a description of the data
and the method of analysis. Section 4 is devoted to the
results of the empirical analysis. Finally, Section 5 sum-
marizes the main findings of this article and presents its
main implications.
2. Theoretical Argument
As opposed to electoral studies (e.g., Müller & Strøm,
2000), the analysis of coalitions has not figured promi-
nently in research on direct democracy so far. To my
knowledge, the contributions by Bowler and Hanneman
(2006), Kriesi (2005, 2006), and Manweller (2005) are
the exception. This article aims to contribute to the lit-
erature by more closely examining the internal structure
of the two opposing camps (i.e., supporters and oppo-
nents of ballotmeasures). In general, political actors face
strong incentives to attract a maximum number of allies
in referendum campaigns. The rationale behind this as-
sumption relates to the fact that citizens have the final
say. As the political elites do not control the outcome
of the vote, the formation of large camps is an effective
way of attempting to enhance their chances of succeed-
ing at the polls. However, this comes at a price. Due to
their actor heterogeneity, broad coalitions are not easy
tomanage.While the binary format of direct-democratic
votes imposes the formation of two camps, the various
organizations involved within a given camp may wish to
adopt substantively distinct campaign strategies. In or-
der to cope with this conflict potential, political actors
are expected to form ICC. In the following, I will argue
that their composition is decisively shaped by the beliefs
of the participating actors.
Inter-organizational cooperation in direct democracy
is best described as ad hoc issue coalitions (Mahoney,
2007). Such coalitions form according to an instrumen-
tal logic. Their members work together in pursuit of a
common issue-specific goal, as they either advocate for
or against the passage of ballot measures. In line with re-
source mobilization theory (McCarthy & Zald, 1977), po-
litical actors can be expected to join coalitions in order to
pool different types of resources (such as money, staff,
volunteers, know-how, and reputation) and wage effec-
tive campaigns. Since ad hoc issue coalitions emerge for
the purpose of a single campaign, they typically dissolve
once the vote takes place (Manweller, 2005). Therefore,
each direct-democratic vote is a rather unique event that
is hardly connected to other votes, even those that take
place simultaneously.
When it comes to coalition formation, the problem
of size occurs in different terms in direct democracy
than in representative democracy. According to the lit-
erature on government formation, parties in representa-
tive democracies tend to form coalitions that are just big
enough to obtain a parliamentarymajority. In contrast to
these ‘minimal winning coalitions’ (Riker, 1962), actors
involved in referendums and initiatives seek to secure
the support of as many organizations as possible. Given
that the decision-making authority eludes the elites, the
formation of broadly supported camps is a centralmeans
by which political actors seek to influence the outcome
of direct-democratic votes. In line with this reasoning,
Kriesi (2005, p. 65, 2006) showed that in the case of
Switzerland, the chances of success at the polls increases
the larger a given camp is. As coalition size is a key deter-
minant of the outcome of direct-democratic votes, polit-
ical elites may seek to gather as many actors as possible
behind their own position.
Yet the complexity of coalition work gets challenged
as the number of organizations increases. Large camps
typically face the problem of heterogeneity, since actors
are likely to stem from different backgrounds. The so-
called ‘extension dilemma’ (Jasper, 2006, pp. 127–128)
states that ‘the further you reach out your alliance, the
more diverse it will become and the less unified’. Camps
with numerous actors are notoriously plagued by ideo-
logical conflicts. In particular, disunity between moder-
ate and radical strands is prone to give rise to endless
quarrels over the strategies to be adopted during refer-
endum campaigns. Such broad coalitions typically face
major difficulties when they are unable to bridge dis-
parate beliefs.
To overcome the problems posed by heterogeneity,
political actors are expected to form ICC with other ac-
tors who share their beliefs. In other words, even when
political actors are on the same camp in a given refer-
endum campaign, they may choose not to work closely
together due to ideological barriers. In line with this
reasoning, social movement scholars established that
groups do not join forces unless they share at least some
common beliefs (van Dyke & McCammon, 2010). In a
similar vein, Manweller (2005) found that activists who
launched initiatives in U.S. states best resolved internal
disagreements by fractionalizing into two ideologically
purer groups.
Based on these considerations, organizations should
split according to ideological criteria. I therefore expect
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ideologically distinct ICC to emerge on both supporters’
and opponents’ sides of direct-democratic campaigns.
3. Research Design
3.1. Case Selection
To test this expectation, I examine two referendums on
asylum that took place in Switzerland in 2006 and 2016.
As is the case of many OECD countries, this topic has
ranked high on the political agenda over the last decades
(Steiner, 2000). The well-developed institutions of direct
democracy have provided political organizations with a
powerful opportunity for politicizing asylum issues in the
Swiss context (Bernhard, 2012, pp. 68–72). I selected the
2006 and 2016 referendums in order to analyze varying
actor constellations.Whereas the left-right conflict is pre-
dominantly available in direct-democratic votes, the un-
bundling of issues can occasionally lead to cross-cutting
cleavages (Bowler & Hanneman, 2006). The ballot mea-
sure submitted in 2006 pitted actors from the radical
right and the moderate right against challengers from
the left, civil society, and some dissidents from the mod-
erate right. This classic antagonism in the Swiss asylum
domain was the result of a decisive tightening reform
of the federal asylum law. Its main provisions were con-
cernedwith restricting access to asylum applications and
reducing the attractiveness of Switzerland as a destina-
tion country. In contrast, the vote held in 2016 gave
rise to a cleavage between moderate and radical forces.
While the organizations from the mainstream came out
in favor of the reform, both radical left and radical right
were against it. This rather unusual alignment was due to
the policy orientation of the reform. This ballot measure
can be considered as a paradigmatic case of streamlin-
ing (Bernhard & Kaufmann, 2018), as it aimed to speed
up asylumprocedures and to structurally reorganize com-
petences and responsibilities within the Swiss asylum do-
main. Participating voters eventually delivered a decisive
verdict on both reforms by accepting them by a two-
thirds majority.
3.2. Data and Methods
The data used for this empirical analysiswere collected in
the framework of ex-post interviews immediately follow-
ing the respective votes. The rationale behind this data
collection strategy is that information regarding coopera-
tion is gathered most precisely from the actors involved.
I surveyed the representatives of the organizations that
actively took part in the two referendum campaigns. I se-
lected the organizations on the basis of various sources:
the parliamentary debates, the campaign for the col-
lection of signatures, voting recommendations, and the
press, as well as websitesmore generally. Due to this pro-
cedure, I am confident that I included the most impor-
tant organizations. There were no refusals when I con-
tacted the interview partners. The absence of missing in-
formation is due to the fact that Swiss political actors
are motivated to participate in such interviews. In to-
tal, there were 46 interviews in 2006 and 31 in 2016.
The elite population in question includes five types of
actors: state actors, parties, economic associations, citi-
zen groups, and committees, i.e., umbrella organizations
that form in an ad hocmanner for the purpose of specific
referendum campaigns.
I relied on the cooperative ties between the organi-
zations in question to identify the ICC. In the framework
of the ex-post interviews, campaign managers were pre-
sented with the complete list of the selected organiza-
tions. Theywere then asked tomark the organizations on
the list with which they had closely collaborated during
the course of the campaign. After they had gone through
the list, I asked them to indicate the three organizations
with which they had collaborated particularly closely. Fi-
nally, I asked which one organization from among the
three they had most closely collaborated with. I then
recoded this information in a square N × N matrix in
which rows and columns consist of the same political
organizations. The number ‘1’ indicates a collaborative
relationship, ‘2’ indicates a particularly close relation-
ship, and ‘3’ represents the closest collaborative tie. Iso-
lated actors, i.e., organizations without any connections
to others, were removed from this analysis. This was rel-
evant to three supporters of the tightening reform—the
Geneva Citizens’ Movement, the Party of Liberties, and
the Swiss Farmers’ Union.
I draw on network analysis to examine the coalition
structures on the basis of this type of relational data.
More specifically, I use block modeling, which allows me
to distinguish between structurally equivalent groups of
actors based on their cooperative relationships. Struc-
tural equivalence is met when two or more actors jointly
have similar ties with third actors independently of their
ties with each other. A block model consists of two ele-
ments (Wasserman & Faust, 1999, p. 395): 1) a partition
of actors in the network into discrete subsets called posi-
tions, and 2) a statement of the presence or absence of a
tie within or between the positions for each pair of posi-
tions. I use the CONCOR algorithm, which applies succes-
sive splits to the network. In the first step, the procedure
divides the set of actors into two structurally equivalent
groups. Next, each group is broken down into another
two structurally equivalent sub-groups, and so forth. Due
to the small number of observations, I decided to stop
the procedure after the second step. Since the organiza-
tions involved in a given campaign do not usually coop-
erate with peers aligned with the rival camps at all, the
first split is expected to generate supporters and oppo-
nents. If this is the case, the second split will reveal the
composition of the two main ICC on either side.
As to the independent variable, my measure of ide-
ology refers to the self-reported positioning on the left-
right axis. As is common in survey questionnaires, I use
a scale that ranges from 0 (completely left) to 10 (com-
pletely right). For the present analysis, I decided to drop
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the Swiss Red Cross from the analysis because its repre-
sentative refused to answer the question on ideology.
4. Empirical Analysis
As expected, the first split applied by CONCORdivides the
supporters from the opponents in both ballot measures.
The second split produces two groups for each of the four
camps under investigation. Table 1 provides an overview
of these eight ICC.
The two main ICC of each camp vary considerably
in terms of their ideological orientation. In the case of
the opponents to the 2006 tightening reform, the mean
score of the first coalition on the self-reported position-
ing of the left-right scale is 2.48, while the second coali-
tion comes close to the political center (M = 4.30). An
independent samples t-test reveals that the organiza-
tions of the former are significantly more to the left than
the latter (t = −3.264, p = 0.003). The left-leaning coali-
tion has 21 organizations. As is visible in Table A.1 in
the Appendix, among these organizations are the main
parties from the left (Social Democrats and Greens),
some trade unions, several citizen groups that defend
the rights of migrants, as well as two committees. How-
ever, this coalition is not confined to organizations from
the left. In addition to some centrist parties (Evangelical
People’s Party and two cantonal sections of the Christian
Democrats), it counts a dissident organization from the
moderate right in its ranks (Free Democrats of Geneva).
I therefore label this coalition ‘left and allies’. The coali-
tion of ‘moderates’ is made up of committees and citizen
groups (n = 10). The most powerful organization of this
ICC is the so-called ‘right-wing committee against the asy-
lum law’. Ideologically close to the moderate right, it mo-
bilized quite intensively against the tightening reform. In
addition to the Swiss Aid for Refugees and Amnesty Inter-
national, this coalition attracted several religious organi-
zations (e.g., the Protestant and the Catholic Churches).
In the case of the supporters of the tightening reform,
CONCOR separates the ‘moderate right’ from the ’radi-
cal right’. This designation is justified in light of the mean
scores displayed by these two ICC (M = 6.43 vs. 8.25).
According to a t-test, the ideological positioning of the
members of these two groups are significantly distinct at
the 5% error level (t = 2.292, p = 0.048). The exact com-
position of these two ICC is available in Table A.2. The
organizations from the moderate right (n = 7) included
powerful federal authorities (Federal Department of Jus-
tice and Police and Federal Office for Migration), three
parties (Free Democrats, Christian Democrats, and Liber-
als), as well as two business groups (Small Business As-
sociation, and Swiss Employers’ Federation). The radical
right coalition was only composed of four organizations.
The levels of power reveal that it was dominated by the
Swiss People’s Party, the country’s largest party.
I now address the ICC in the case of the 2016 stream-
lining reform. As far as the opponents are concerned,
two clearly distinctive coalitions emerge in ideological
terms—the ‘radical left’ and the ‘radical right’. Themean
of the self-reported ideology on the left-right axis equals
1.00 for the radical left and 7.25 for the radical right. Un-
surprisingly, the means of these two groups are signifi-
cantly different from each other (t = 9.934, p = 0.000).
The list in Table A.3 shows that each ICC included four
organizations. On the radical left, three out of the four
organizations are based in the French-speaking part of
Switzerland (the committee called ‘Appeal for the pro-
tection of the right to asylum’, the Trotskyites from
Solidarity, and the citizen group Stop exclusion). On the
radical right, the Swiss People’s Party joined forces with
another party (Swiss Democrats), an economic associa-
tion (Homeowners Association Switzerland), and a con-
servative citizen group (Security for all!). A closer look
at the cooperative ties in the opponents’ camp reveals
that there was no joint work at all between themembers
of these two coalitions. Despite the fact that both cam-
paigned for the rejection of the streamlining reform, the
organizations from the ‘no camp’ restricted their cooper-
ation to actors with similar beliefs. This is due to the fact
that these two radical groups opposed this ballot mea-
sure for entirely different reasons.
The findings prove to be somewhat less spectacular
on the side of supporters. The two ICC significantly differ
from each other when it comes to their ideological posi-
Table 1. Overview of ICC by ballot measure.
Camp Affiliation Left-Right (0–10) Number of Organizations
Tightening Reform (2006)
1 Left and allies opponents 2.48 21
2 Moderates opponents 4.30 10
3 Moderate right supporters 6.43 7
4 Radical right supporters 8.25 4
Streamlining Reform (2016)
1 Radical left opponents 1.00 4
2 Radical right opponents 7.25 4
3 Left and allies supporters 3.25 12
4 Moderates supporters 5.00 11
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tioning (t = 2.888, p = 0.009). The twelve organizations
comprising the ‘left and allies’ coalition exhibit an aver-
age score of 3.26 on the left-right scale, while the eleven
members of the ‘moderates’ ICC have a score that is ex-
actly in the middle (M= 5.00). Despite this basic pattern,
there are someoverlaps (see Table A.4). On the onehand,
the CONCOR algorithm assigns three centrist organiza-
tions to the left-leaning coalition (Amnesty International,
Operation Libero, and the Conference of Swiss Bishops).
On the other hand, it is striking that the Social Democrats
from the left are part of the ‘moderates’ group. A closer
look reveals that this party had close ties with the Fed-
eral Department of Justice and Police. This cooperation
can be explained by the fact that the minister in charge
of this reform was a member of the Social Democrats at
that time.
5. Conclusion
This article aimed to contribute to the underdeveloped
literature on coalitions in direct democracy by examin-
ing the composition of ICC. The binary format of bal-
lot measures leads to the formation of two opposing
camps—supporters and opponents. However, political
actors who advocate for or against the passage of issue-
specific propositions are not obliged to cooperate closely
with actors who defend the same position during a par-
ticular referendumcampaign.While coalitions are advan-
tageous for pooling the resources of their members, in-
creasing the number of coalition partners introduces the
problem of heterogeneity. Due to ideological differences
among political actors, disagreements and conflicts over
substantial campaign decisions are likely to occur. In
order to avoid such impediments to cooperation, I ex-
pected that political actors on either camp would form
coalitions that were ideologically more homogeneous,
while being distinctive from each other.
The empirical analysis, which focuses on two referen-
dums on asylum held in Switzerland at the federal level
in 2006 and 2016 respectively, finds that the formation
of ICC is ideologically driven. Based on network analysis
tools, I demonstrated that the organizations that form
the four camps under scrutiny significantly differ from
one another when it comes to their average positioning
on the left-right axis. Hence, diverging beliefs tend to dis-
courage political actors from joining forces during cam-
paigns. The opponents of the streamlining reform prob-
ably illustrate this finding best. In this case, the organi-
zations from the radical left and the radical right did not
cooperate with each other at all, despite their pursuit of
the same goal of defeating the reform.
As to the limitations of this contribution, some cau-
tionmust be exercised when generalizing the results pre-
sented here. Indeed, this empirical analysis focuses on
a narrow selection of cases: the organizations that par-
ticipated in two direct-democratic campaigns on asylum
in the peculiar Swiss political system. I would therefore
like to encourage scholars who work on coalitions to ex-
pand the number of ballot measures, issue domains, and
country contexts under examination. Additionally, I be-
lieve that more detailed analyses would help to provide
an understanding of the dynamic processes of coalition
formation in direct democracy by more carefully exam-
ining the mechanisms that produce, or fail to produce,
coalitions between political actors. Due to the absence of
this kind of research, the literature on social movements
may provide guidance for such endeavors (van Dyke &
McCammon, 2010).
Future studies may further explore the conditions
under which political actors that are engaged in direct-
democratic campaigns form ideologically homogeneous
ICC. Ceteris paribus, this is more likely to occur the more
organizations decide to go public on a given camp. It can
be assumed that higher numbers of actors increase the
probability of diverging beliefs. In order to cope with this
challenge, participating actors may factionalize accord-
ing to ideological criteria. An illustrative example of such
intra-camp divisions is the 2016 Italian constitutional ref-
erendum (Bull, 2016; Pasquino & Valbruzzi, 2017), which
led to the resignation of Prime Minster Matteo Renzi. In
this case, the numerous opponents of this institutional
reform regrouped themselves into several committees.
The two most important ones were the ‘Committee for
No’, whichwas formedbased on the initiative of themain
parties from the right, and ‘I Vote No’, which was cre-
ated by civil society actors and attracted opponents from
the left. Based on this organizational structure, it seems
rather obvious that the members of these two commit-
tees did not work together closely. Similar patterns are
likely to have emerged from the 2014 Scottish indepen-
dence referendum (Paterson, 2015) and the 2016 Brexit
referendum (Clarke, Goodwin, & Whiteley, 2017), given
that in both cases a plethora of actors with distinctive be-
liefs belonged to the same camp.
Another promising avenue for research involves con-
sidering the effects of coalition structures. Given that
rational actors ultimately aim to win direct-democratic
votes, scholars could analyze whether the formation of
ideologically-driven ICC increases their chances of suc-
cess at the polls. Since homogeneous coalitions are less
prone to suffering from internal conflicts, political actors
may be able to campaign in an effective manner. How-
ever, if members of heterogeneous coalitions manage
to avoid major conflicts, they are likely to benefit from
economies of scale due to the pooling of their resources.
This pooling of resources would allow them to achieve a
higher level of attention among citizens, thus increasing
the likelihood of bringing their engagement to a victori-
ous end.
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Appendix
Table A.1. Actor composition of the opponents of the tightening reform by ICC.
Actor type Standardized power Left-right (0–10)
Left and allies
Committee Twofold No Committee 0.36 3
Social Democrats Party 0.23 2
Cultural workers against the asylum law Committee 0.21 2
Stop exclusion Citizen group 0.17 2
Greens Party 0.13 1
Solidarity without borders Citizen group 0.08 1
Forum for the integration of migrants Citizen group 0.06 3
Sans papiers collective Citizen group 0.06 2
Unia Economic association 0.06 2
Swiss Federation of Trade Unions Economic association 0.05 2
SolidaritéS Party 0.04 0
Evangelical People’s Party Party 0.04 5
Christian Democrats of the Canton of Geneva Party 0.04 5
Free Democrats of the Canton of Geneva Party 0.04 6
AGORA Citizen group 0.03 3
Comedia Economic association 0.03 1
Communists Party 0.03 1
Young Socialists Party 0.03 1
Christian Democrats of the Canton of Vaud Party 0.02 5
Travail Suisse Economic association 0.01 3
Politakt Citizen group 0.00 2
2.48
Moderates
Right-wing committee against the asylum law Committee 0.34 5
Swiss Aid for Refugees Citizen group 0.33 3
Coalition for a humanitarian Switzerland Committee 0.31 5
Conference of Swiss Bishops Citizen group 0.18 5
Amnesty international Citizen group 0.13 5
Charity of the Protestant Churches of Switzerland Citizen group 0.13 4
Federation of Swiss Protestant Churches Citizen group 0.11 5
Charity of Swiss Jews Citizen group 0.04 5
Christians and Jews for the freedom to Aid Citizen group 0.04 2
Protestant Church of the Canton of Zurich Citizen group 0.02 4
4.30
Note: Within the two ICC, the actors are listed according to their standardized power, which is based on a reputational measure.
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Table A.2. Actor composition of the supporters of the tightening reform by ICC.
Actor type Standardized power Left-right (0–10)
Moderate right
Federal Department of Justice and Police State actor 0.41 6
Federal Office for Migration State actor 0.32 5
Christian Democrats Party 0.13 5
Free Democrats Party 0.08 7
Liberal Party Party 0.06 6
Small Business Association Economic association 0.01 8
Swiss Employers’ Federation Economic association 0.00 8
6.43
Radical right
Swiss People’s Party Party 0.55 8
Campaign for an independent and neutral Switzerland Citizen group 0.11 10
Evangelical Democratic Union Party 0.01 8
Young4fun.ch Citizen group 0.01 7
8.25
Note: Within the two ICC, the actors are listed according to their standardized power, which is based on a reputational measure.
Table A.3. Actor composition of the opponents of the streamlining reform by ICC.
Actor type Standardized power Left-right (0–10)
Radical left
Appeal for the protection of the right to asylum Committee 0.13 2
SolidaritéS Party 0.05 1
Stop exclusion Citizen group 0.01 1
BastA! Party 0.01 0
1.00
Radical right
Swiss People’s Party Party 0.65 8
Homeowners Association Switzerland Economic association 0.17 7
Swiss Democrats Party 0.02 6
Security for all! Citizen group 0.02 8
7.25
Note: Within the two ICC, the actors are listed according to their standardized power, which is based on a reputational measure.
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Table A.4. Actor composition of the supporters of the streamlining reform by ICC.
Actor type Standardized power Left-right (0–10)
Left and allies
Operation Libero Citizen group 0.28 5
Amnesty international Citizen group 0.19 5
Charity of the Protestant Churches of Switzerland Citizen group 0.17 3
Greens Party 0.12 2
Solidarity without borders Citizen group 0.08 2
Caritas Citizen group 0.04 4
Young Socialists Party 0.03 1
Federation of Swiss Protestant Churches Citizen group 0.02 4
Swiss Aid for Refugees Citizen group 0.01 3
Swiss Workers’ Aid Organization Citizen group 0.01 2
Unia Economic association 0.01 3
Conference of Swiss Bishops Citizen group 0.00 5
3.25
Moderates
Federal Department of Justice and Police State actor 0.58 5
State Secretariat for Migration State actor 0.41 5
Social Democrats Party 0.27 2
Cantonal Directors of Justice and Police State actor 0.20 7
Christian Democrats Party 0.22 6
Free Democrats Party 0.19 7
Cantonal Social Directors State actor 0.09 3
Conservative Democrats Party 0.04 6
Green Liberals Party 0.03 5
Swiss Associations of Cities State actor 0.03 5
Evangelical People’s Party Party 0.01 4
5.00
Note: Within the two ICC, the actors are listed according to their standardized power, which is based on a reputational measure.
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